We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which …rms make directed o¤ers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the stable match. In the presence of market frictions and preference uncertainty, harsher assumptions on the richness of the economy have to be made in order for decentralized markets to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium.
1. Introduction
Overview
The theoretical literature on two sided matching markets has focused predominantly on the analysis of outcomes generated in centralized markets. There are many examples in which two sided matching markets are centralized (e.g., the medical residency match, school allocations, the U.S. market for reform rabbis, etc.). Nonetheless, many markets are not fully centralized (for instance, college admissions in the U.S., the market for law clerks, junior economists, and so on). Furthermore, almost all centralized markets are preceded by decentralized opportunities for participants to match. Understanding the outcomes generated by decentralized markets is therefore important to the design of institutions, both fully decentralized ones, as well as ones followed by centralized procedures. 1 The current paper o¤ers a …rst step in that direction.
The key feature of centralized clearinghouses that empirically predicts their continued use in a market is whether they produce a stable outcome.
2 From a theoretical perspective, the set of stable outcomes coincides with the core in environments such as the ones we study.
The assumption that markets achieve the core is, in fact, utilized in empirical work that uses stability constraints to deduce market participants'characteristics. 3 Our results provide conditions under which a (non-cooperative) decentralized market game yields a core outcome, and the econometric identifying assumption of stability is likely to hold. When the structure of the economy does not guarantee existence of a stable outcome, there may be room for market design if stability is taken as a goal. 4 We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which …rms make directed 1 See Roth (1984 Roth ( , 2008 . For the recent literature on di¤erences in outcomes between centralized clearinghouses and decentralized markets see Frechette, Roth, and Unver (2007) and Niederle and Roth (2003) . They also show that the consequences of a decentralized matching process prior to a centralized match can be large, as documented by the collapse of the market for gastroentorology fellows. On rare occasions, decentralized bargaining prior to the centralized match is prohibited by design, such as in some residency matches in the UK (Roth, 1991) .
2 A stable match is a pairing of workers and …rms (where some workers and some …rms may be left alone), in which no …rm (worker) who is matched to a worker (…rm), prefers to be alone, and no …rm and worker pair prefer to jointly deviate by matching to one another. For empirical evidence on the importance of stability for a centralized clearinghouse see Roth (1991). o¤ers to workers. In our setup, a market game is identi…ed by three components: the preference distribution of agents (workers and …rms), the information agents have about their own and others'realized preferences, and the extent of frictions in the economy.
In more detail, we focus on markets in which …rms can employ up to one worker, who can work for at most one …rm. We assume that a match with any agent is preferred to remaining unmatched. We consider environments in which there is a unique stable match. This allows us to sidestep coordination problems. Furthermore, we concentrate on a special class of preferences that guarantee uniqueness of the stable match that we term aligned preferences.
Aligned preferences require that the preferences of …rms and workers can be represented by a joint ordinal potential. Alignment implies that there is always a …rm-worker pair that are each other's …rst choice. Many prominent cases studied in the literature entail aligned preferences.
For instance, alignment is guaranteed whenever …rms and workers generate revenue they split in …xed proportions, or when all participants on one side of the market share the same preference ranking of the other side's participants (that can have arbitrary preferences).
In our decentralized market game, in every period, each …rm can make up to one o¤er to a worker of her choice if she does not already have an o¤er held by a worker in the market.
Workers can accept, reject, or hold on to an o¤er, in which case it is available also in the next period. Firms and workers share a common discount factor, and receive their match utilities as soon as they are matched (by having an o¤er accepted), or leave the market. This allows us to study the e¤ect of frictions through discounting.
We study two cases of information agents have about their own and each others'preferences: (a) complete information in which all market participants are fully informed of the realized match utilities; (b) private information in which each agent is fully informed only of her own match utilities. While the extant literature has mostly focused on complete information environments (see below), we …nd the case of private information particularly important from an empirical point of view.
Throughout our analysis, we concentrate on equilibria in weakly undominated strategies.
Under complete information, all agents can compute the stable match and we show that the stable match is an equilibrium outcome in the market game we analyze. Still, there may be equilibria that yield unstable matches, highlighting a …rst contrast with …ndings from the case in which agents use a centralized market, where all equilibria in weakly undominated strategies yield the stable match. Nonetheless, simple re…nements (namely, iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) restore uniqueness of the stable match as an equilibrium outcome.
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When information is private, in a frictionless economy, stable matches may still be implemented as an equilibrium outcome. Underlying this result is the idea that …rms and workers can replicate, in essence, the …rm proposing Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) as part of an equilibrium pro…le: …rms make o¤ers to workers in order of their preferences, and workers accept o¤ers when they are made by their most preferred …rms. The fact that aligned preferences assure there is always a …rm-worker pair that are each others'…rst choice guarantees that at least one …rm and worker are matched in every period.
In particular, such a strategy pro…le leads to a market match in …nite time.
However, as soon as there are frictions in the market, agents may have incentives to deviate from these strategies to speed up the matching process, or a¤ect market participants'learning regarding their expected stable matches. Our analysis then follows two steps. First, ignoring incentive compatibility constraints, we characterize the class of strategy pro…les that generate stable outcomes. Second, we identify economies under which at least one of these (possibly mixed) pro…les is incentive compatible. The message that emerges is that when the economy is su¢ ciently rich in terms of possible market realizations, there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that implements the unique stable match.
Related Literature
There are several recent theoretical advances that inspect market outcomes as consequences of a dynamic interaction. Haeringer and Wooders (2009) and Pais (2008) consider the case of complete information, and restrict …rms'strategies in that they cannot make o¤ers to workers who had rejected them previously. Haeringer and Wooders (2009) study a game similar to ours in which …rms can only make exploding o¤ers (that have to be accepted or rejected right away).
In Pais (2008) one …rm is chosen randomly each period to make an o¤er. She characterizes the set of (ordinal) subgame perfect equilibria and shows that outcome multiplicity may arise even when the underlying market has a unique stable match. 6, 7 Our setup bears some similarity to that considered in the search literature on matching (e.g., Burdett and Coles, 1997 , Eeckhout, 1999 , and Shimer and Smith, 2000 . There, each period, workers and …rms randomly encounter each other, observe the resulting match utilities, and decide jointly whether to pursue the match and leave the market or to separate and wait for future periods. As in our setting, equilibrium outcomes depend on the distribution of match utilities. Unlike our setting, the perceived distribution of potential partners does not change with time, and each side of the market solves an option value problem.
Regarding our assumptions, alignment is reminiscent of some identi…ed su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness of a stable match (Clark, 2006 and Eeckhout, 2000) .
The Model

The Economy
A market is a triplet M = (F; W; U ), where F = f1; :::; F g and W = f1; :::; W g are disjoint …nite sets of …rms and workers, respectively, and U = the matrices corresponding to utilities from …rm-worker pairs for both sides of the market.
For simplicity we assume that: (1) …rms and workers have strict preferences. That is, for any …rm i; u 6 The role of commitment in dynamic games as ours with complete information is highlighted in Diamantoudi, Miyagawa, and Xue (2007) . Similarly, Blum, Roth and Rothblum (1997) study dynamics when the …rms'but not the workers'commitments are binding.
7 There is also some work analyzing endogenous salaries in decentralized markets with complete information and limited dynamics see Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008) . For the analysis of wages in a centralized clearinghouse, see Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982) . Related empirical work (such as Choo and Siow, 2006 and Fox, 2008) has used constraints derived from stability with transferable utility to estimate underlying preference parameters. The link between dynamic interaction and stability has been suggested in the context of implementation as well. With complete information, Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) study a game of two stages. First, …rms make o¤ers. Then, workers reply. They demonstrate that this game implements the stable matches (see also Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo, and Romero-Medina, 1998) . 8 Cardinal utilities are required to trade o¤ matchings at di¤erent points in time and examine the impacts of discounting.
(2) match utilities are strictly positive -for all i 2 F and j 2 W [ ?, u f ij > 0; and similarly for all j 2 W and i 2 F [ ?; u w ij > 0; (3) all agents prefer to be matched over remaining unmatched. Therefore, for any i 2 F, all workers j 2 W are acceptable, u f ij > u f i? , and for any j 2 W, all …rms i 2 F are acceptable, u w ij > u w ?j : For …xed sets F and W of …rms and workers, an economy is a …nite collection of markets f(F; W; U )g U 2U together with a distribution G over possible utility levels U 2 U:
we say that k is matched under : A blocking pair for a match is a pair
A match is stable if it is not blocked by any pair (note that matches are not blocked by individuals, as all agents prefer to be matched over remaining unmatched). Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that any market has a stable match, and provided an algorithm that identi…es one. In the …rm proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, in step 1, each …rm makes an o¤er to its most preferred worker. Workers collect o¤ers, hold the o¤er from their most preferred …rm, and reject all other o¤ers. In a general step k; …rms whose o¤er got rejected in the last step make an o¤er to the most preferred worker who has not rejected them yet. Workers once more collect o¤ers, including, possibly, an o¤er held from a previous step, keep their most preferred o¤er, and reject all other o¤ers. The algorithm ends when there are no more o¤ers that are rejected, that is, any …rm either has their o¤er held by a worker, or has been rejected by all workers. Once the algorithm ends, held o¤ers turn into matches.
The resulting match is the …rm optimal stable match, i.e., for any …rm it is the stable match that is not dominated by any other stable match. It is in turn the least preferred stable match for workers. Similarly, there always exists a worker optimal stable match, which is the least preferred stable match for …rms. In general, these two matches can be di¤erent, and many other stable matches can exist.
In this paper we do not want problems of coordination on a speci…c stable match to be the hurdle to the existence of an equilibrium yielding a stable outcome in the market game (the details of which we soon describe). Therefore, we only consider markets M = (F; W; U ) that have a unique stable match denoted by M . In such markets a centralized mechanism, to which agents submit rank ordered lists of preferences, has an equilibrium that always generates the stable outcome, while this is not the case when there are multiple stable matches (see e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990 , and section 3 in the paper).
Aligned Preferences
The literature has not identi…ed general necessary and su¢ cient conditions on a market for the stable match to be unique. Throughout our analysis, we will focus on a class of preferences, termed aligned preferences, that guarantees uniqueness of the stable match.
De…nition (Aligned Preferences) Firms and workers have aligned preferences if there exists an ordinal potential = ( ij ) i2F ;j2W ; ij 2 R; such that for any workers j; j 0 2 W and …rms i; i 0 2 F:
The notion of ordinal potential is analogous to that of a potential in two player games in which agents'match utilities replace the payo¤ matrix
(see Monderer and Shapley, 1994) .
Conceptually, preference alignment imposes a link between …rms'and workers '(ordinal) preferences through the ordinal potential. The preference ranking of both sides of the market can be captured using one common matrix . LetÛ f =Û w = ( ij ) i2F ;j2W , thenÛ f andÛ w capture the same ordinal preferences over partners as U f ; U w :
Most applied papers implicitly assume that preferences are aligned (see, e.g., Sorensen, 2007 , and references therein). In particular, two prominent examples of aligned preferences are the following:
Examples of Aligned Preferences 1. Firms and workers have a joint production output they share in …xed proportions when they are matched. That is, there exists a number > 0 such that for all (i; j) 2
Here, = ( ij ) i2F ;j2W de…ned as ij = u f ij for all i; j; serves as an ordinal potential.
2. Suppose one side of the market has the same preference ranking over participants on the other side of the market (the preferences of whom can be arbitrary). To see that these preferences are aligned, assume without loss of generality that it is the …rms who share the same preference ordering over workers. Order the workers according to this ranking, with worker 1 being the least preferred worker and worker n being the most preferred worker. Normalize each worker's match utilities toũ Remark (Alignment -Uniqueness) When preferences are aligned, there is a unique stable match.
Providing the intuition for uniqueness will be substantially easier once we present other properties of aligned preferences.
One important attribute of preference alignment is that when …rms make o¤ers in the order of their preferences, a rejected o¤er of a worker cannot trigger a chain of o¤ers and rejections that results in an o¤er from a more desirable …rm. That is, if a worker j rejects an o¤er from …rm i, then the resulting chain of o¤ers can only result in o¤ers to worker j that he prefers less than the o¤er from …rm i: Formally, there is no sequence i 1 ; :::; i n 2 F and j 1 ; :::; j n 2 W such that j 1 by rejecting i 2 can trigger an o¤er from a preferred i 1 :
Note that such a chain would be equivalent to having a cycle in the payo¤ matrix U w ; U f .
We then say that preferences satisfy the no cycle property. As it turns out, the characterization of potential games by Voorneveld and Norde (1997) assures that preference alignment is equivalent to the no cycle property.
A market (F;W;Ũ ) is a sub-market of (F; W; U ) ifF F;W W; and 8i; j 2 (F [
A second implication of preference alignment is that for any sub-market (F;W;Ũ ) there is a …rm i and a worker j that form a top top match, i.e. worker j is …rm i 0 s most preferred worker withinW and …rm i is worker j 0 s most preferred …rm withinF. We say that preferences satisfy the top-top match property.
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Intuitively, when preferences are aligned, the original market, as well as any sub-market, has an ordinal potential. Suppose~ is an ordinal potential of the sub-market (F;W;Ũ ): Consider a pair (i; j) 2 arg max (i 0 ;j 0 )2F W~ i 0 j 0 : It follows that (i; j) is a top-top match in (F;W;Ũ ):
Hence preference alignment implies the top-top match property.
This observation provides the intuition for the fact that a stable match is unique. In fact, it can be identi…ed through a recursive process. In the initial step, …nd the …rm-worker pairs that constitute top top matches, pairs (i; j) at which the ordinal potential = ( ij ) achieves a local maximum. The corresponding …rms and workers must be matched to each other for the match to be stable. The remaining …rms and workers form a market with aligned preferences and we can continue recursively. By construction, this procedure generates the unique stable match.
Finally, preferences admit a stable blocking pair whenever for any match 6 = M there exists a blocking pair (i; j) such that M (i) = j: Note that when preferences are not aligned (even if there is a unique stable match M ), any unstable match will allow for a blocking
That is, both i and j prefer the outcome in the stable match M to the outcome in (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) . When preferences are aligned there exists a stable blocking pair: a blocking pair (i; j) for which M (i) = j. Indeed, suppose 6 = M : Going through the recursive process described above (to illustrate uniqueness), at some stage a discrepancy must arise between M and :
At that stage, a match that occurs under M does not get formed. In fact, the corresponding worker and …rm form a stable blocking pair. Proposition 1 summarizes all these claims. It easy to check that the top-top match and stable blocking pair properties hold. Nonetheless, U exhibits a rejection chain, and hence does not correspond to aligned preferences: 
A Decentralized Market
For a given economy f(F; W; U )g U 2U together with a distribution G over utility realizations U , we analyze the following market game. The economy, together with the distribution G; is common knowledge to all agents. At the outset of the game, the market is realized according to the distribution G. Firms make o¤ers over time, indexed by t = 1; 2; ::: and workers react to them. Speci…cally, each period has three stages. In the …rst stage, eligible …rms simultaneously decide whether and to whom to make an o¤er and whether to exit the market. In the second stage of any period, workers observe which …rms exited, and observe only the o¤ers they received themselves. Each worker j who has received an o¤er from …rm i can accept, reject, or hold the o¤er. Once an o¤er is accepted, worker j is matched to …rm i: Workers can also decide to exit the market. In the third stage, …rms observe rejections and deferrals of their own o¤ers. Finally, all participants are informed of the agents who exited the market and the participants who got matched.
Eligible …rms are …rms i that have not yet hired a worker and have no o¤er held by a worker. In each period t, eligible …rms can make up to one o¤er to any worker that has not yet been matched.
We consider market games without frictions, and market games with frictions, which take the form of discounting. If a …rm i is matched to worker j at time t; …rm i receives t u f ij and worker j receives t u w ij ; where 2 [0; 1] is the market discount factor. As long as agents are unmatched, they receive 0 in each period. One interpretation is that once a worker and a …rm are matched, they receive their match utility, or, equivalently, they receive a constant, perpetual stream of payo¤s, the present value of which is their match utility. One can also interpret the discount factor as the probability of market collapse, or the probability that each …rm loses its position and receives a payo¤ of 0 (and, analogously, the probability that each worker leaves the market and receives 0 as well).
The fact that time is valuable as described through discounting provides a major obstacle to the decentralized market game reaching a stable outcome. In the conclusions we address other ways in which congestion and market frictions might arise, e.g., …xed costs for making o¤ers, and other possible rules of the market game.
We focus on two con…gurations of information in the economy. The simplest is that of complete information in which both …rms' and workers' match utilities are common knowledge. 11 This is the case that most of the literature on decentralized matching has tackled.
Note that in this case, both …rms and workers can deduce the stable outcome M .
The second information structure we analyze is that of private information. In that setup, each agent is informed only of her own match utilities. In the case of private information, for an equilibrium of the market game to be a stable outcome, information has to be transmitted to allow agents to deduce their stable match partner.
Each of these information structures de…nes a Bayesian game where type spaces correspond to the available private information of each agent. The equilibrium notion we use is that of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. When information is complete, type spaces are singletons and we essentially characterize the Nash equilibria of the corresponding game.
Our analysis concentrates on equilibria of decentralized market games in which all agents use weakly undominated strategies. For both information structures, weak undominance imposes several restrictions on equilibrium play:
1. A worker who accepts an o¤er always accepts his best available o¤er. In particular, a worker cannot exit and simultaneously reject an o¤er (since, by de…nition, o¤ers always lead to a higher payo¤).
11 The crucial assumption in the analysis of the complete information case is that each agent knows all other agents'preference ordering. 2. When < 1; a worker who receives an o¤er from his most preferred unmatched …rm accepts it immediately and, similarly, if only agents on one side of the market are unmatched, they exit immediately.
Note that restriction 2 is due to the fact that all payo¤s are strictly positive.
Centralized Matching
Before analyzing decentralized markets, we analyze the case of a centralized clearinghouse (such as ones used by medical markets and many school districts) to which agents simultaneously submit preferences. The centralized clearinghouse uses an algorithm that produces a stable outcome given the submitted preferences. We show that, in our environment, with a centralized clearinghouse it is always possible to elicit preferences of agents in a way that yields the stable match as an equilibrium outcome. To ease analogies between centralized and decentralized markets, we assume that agents in a centralized market report match utilities that are then translated into ordinal preferences. That is, each agent submits a vector of positive match utilities.
12 Technically, this is equivalent to having agents simply report ordinal preferences directly.
For each type of agent 2 ff; wg; and each agent l; let P (u l ) be the strict ordinal preferences associated with l's reported match utilities; in which ties are broken depending on the index of the relevant match partners and in favor of being matched. 13 Speci…cally,
We de…ne a deferred acceptance mechanism as a mechanism in which each agent l of type 2 ff; wg reports their match utilities u l simultaneously (after receiving all private information). The mechanism then computes the corresponding ordinal preferences P and associates them with the stable match induced by the …rm proposing deferred acceptance algorithm on P: The payo¤s of …rms and workers correspond to their match utilities given by their match partner. Throughout the paper, we will use the shorthand of DA for the label of "deferred acceptance". 12 The restriction to positive numbers is made only for presentation simplicity. The su¢ cient restriction is that the set of available reports contains as many elements as the maximal number of di¤erent match utilities. 13 Note that even though agents never experience indi¤erence in their realized match utilities, they may still report indi¤erences.
It follows directly from incentive compatibility attributes of the DA algorithm that the DA mechanism allows for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies in which the resulting match corresponds to the unique stable match in each market of the economy (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) . That is, Lemma (Centralized Matching)
1. For any economy with a unique market all Nash equilibria in weakly undominated strategies of the game associated with the DA mechanism yield the unique stable match M :
2. For any economy there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies of the game associated with the DA mechanism such that the corresponding match is the unique stable match M in each market.
It is important to note that even though implementing the stable match is always possible through the centralized clearinghouse, the stable match is not necessarily the unique equilibrium outcome in the presence of uncertainty (see Niederle and Yariv, 2009 ).
Complete Information
We start by analyzing economies in which all participants are informed of the realized market.
That is, there is complete information regarding all match utilities, and all agents can compute the stable match. In particular, achieving the stable match can be done in one period.
Intuitively, consider strategies where each …rm makes an o¤er to its stable match partner, or exits the market if it is unmatched under the unique stable match M : Each worker accepts his best available o¤er in period 1, and if he receives no o¤ers, exits the market. This pro…le constitutes an equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies that yields the match M :
Ruling out weakly dominated strategies is not su¢ cient to guarantee uniqueness. First, there may still be multiple equilibria generating M . Indeed, for su¢ ciently high discount factors, an alternative way involves emulating the DA algorithm. Since this pro…le may entail several periods of market activity, it would generate di¤erent equilibrium payo¤s.
Furthermore, there may be outcomes generated by equilibria in weakly undominated strategies that do not coincide with the stable match M as the following example illustrates.
Example 1 (Multiplicity with Complete Information). Consider an economy with four …rms fF 1; F 2; F 3; F 4g and four workers fW 1; W 2; W 3; W 4g ; in which u f ij = u w ij : The following matrix de…nes the payo¤s of all matches:
5 6 3 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
; where bold entries correspond to the unique stable match: M (F i) = W i for all i: Consider the following pro…le of weakly undominated strategies yielding the match : (F 1) = W 2; (F 2) = W 1; (F 3) = W 3 and (F 4) = W 4 (corresponding to the underlined entries in the matrix). In period 1; …rms F 2 and F 4 make an o¤er to worker W 1 = (F 2) and W 4 = (F 4) respectively. W 1 and W 4 accept these o¤ers immediately, while workers W 2 and W 3 do not accept any o¤er (unless from their most preferred unmatched …rm). In period 2; …rms F 1 and F 3 make an o¤er to W 2 = (F 1) and W 3 = (F 3); respectively, who accept their o¤er. O¤ equilibrium, if workers W 1 and W 4 do not receive an o¤er from any …rm in period 1 they exit, otherwise all workers reject any o¤er they receive (as long as they're not from their …rst choice …rm) and stay in the market until period 2. In period 2; if …rms F 2 and F 4 have not matched with (F 2) and (F 4) respectively, F 3 makes an o¤er to W 2 instead of W 3 = (F 3) if possible. If W 2 has already exited the market, F 3 makes an o¤er to its most preferred unmatched worker, and exits in case all workers left the market. Furthermore, in period 2, any worker who does not receive o¤ers exits immediately, otherwise accepts his best o¤er. Any …rm that gets rejected in period 1 exits the market in the beginning of period 2. This pro…le constitutes an equilibrium.
The crux of the problem generating the multiplicity above is that elimination of weakly dominated strategies provides little restraint on o¤-equilibrium behavior. Speci…cally, F 3 could "punish"F 2 for not making an o¤er to W 1 = (F 2) in period 1. 14 Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies rules out such strategies, and in fact, guarantees that the stable match is the unique equilibrium outcome, as the following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 2 (Complete Information) For any economy, there exists a Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies that yields the stable match for each realized market.
Furthermore, the stable match of each realized market is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome surviving iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
When using strategies that survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, …rms and workers that form top-top matches must be matched in period 1: Consider the top-top matches in the remaining sub-market. Since the corresponding workers realize the top-top matches in the original market are formed in period 1; iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies assures that they accept their top-top matches in the remaining market, and therefore the corresponding …rms make those o¤ers and are matched in period 1 as well. Continuing recursively we get that iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies guarantees the unique stable match of the market being implemented in one period.
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Note that this construction hinges on the fact that all agents are completely informed of the realized market, and hence each …rm and worker can compute the stable match. Proposition 2 shows that a robust non-cooperative market game equilibrium results necessarily in the unique stable match (the unique core outcome in this market). In what follows we illustrate the impact of preference uncertainty in the economy.
Economies with Uncertainty
For a decentralized market to reach a stable outcome, su¢ cient information has to be transmitted to ensure that (i) workers only accept o¤ers from …rms that are their stable match and
(ii) …rms make o¤ers to those workers. Furthermore, the decentralized market has to allow for this information to be transmitted in an incentive compatible way.
There are three channels through which information ‡ows in the market game. First, information is publicly transmitted when agents exit the market or form a match. Second, information is privately transmitted when workers receive o¤ers from …rms and workers respond 15 The uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes is due to preference alignment. In fact, Niederle and Yariv (2009) show that without preference alignment, equilibria surviving iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies may generate multiple outcomes, even when information is complete.
to those o¤ers (unless o¤ers are accepted, in which case that information becomes public).
The third component of information is time -all participants are aware of the period they are in.
Recall that alignment implies the top top match property. Hence, if …rms and workers follow strategies that resemble the DA algorithm (namely, …rms make o¤ers to workers in order of their preferences and workers hold on to their best available o¤er and only accept an o¤er only from their most preferred available …rm), then in every period some agents are matched and public information is transmitted. Furthermore, this process yields the stable outcome.
The main hurdle for establishing stability is that these DA strategies may not be incentive compatible. First, agents may have an incentive to speed up the timing of matches. Second, market activity throughout the game allows participants to learn about the realized market.
Since updating a¤ects the …nal matching outcomes, agents may have incentives to deviate from DA strategies in order to manipulate the updating process of other participants.
Learning in a Decentralized Market
Before investigating strategies of …rms and workers, we describe the information agents have at each period t. Let M t (F [ ?) (W [ ?) denote the matches formed at time t (including …rms and workers who leave the market by themselves), and let the set of agents who exited the market up to, but excluding, period t be
F ? be the set of …rms that leave the market in the …rst stage of period t:
At the beginning of period t; each active …rm i observes a history that consists of the (timed) o¤ers the …rm made, the responses of workers to those o¤ers, denoted by r for rejection and h for holding (where we use the notational convention that an o¤er to no worker is denoted as an o¤er to ? that is immediately rejected), and the (timed) set of agents that have left the market:
In addition, at each period t; suppose workers j 1 ; :::; j k(t 1) rejected o¤ers from …rm i in periods 1; :::; t 1: Denote byW t i = jjj = 2 j 1 ; :::; j k(t 1) the set of workers that have not rejected
…rm i yet.
Each unmatched worker acts in the interim stage of each period t and observes a history that consists of all (timed) o¤ers he received, a (timed) sequence of o¤ers he held, the (timed) set of agents that have left the market prior to t, and the set of …rms that left the market at time t:
In addition, at each period t; suppose …rms i 1 ; :::; i k(t) made o¤ers to worker j in periods 1; :::; t.
Denote byF t j = iju w ij max u w lj jl = i 1 ; :::i k(t) the set of …rms that have not made an o¤er to worker j yet and that he weakly prefers to any …rm that has made him an o¤er thus far.
Agents use the observed history to update the posterior on the realized markets, and the resulting potential stable match partners. For a given prior distribution G over possible utility levels U 2 U; for any private information u l (:) of agent l of type 2 ff; wg regarding the realized market, let G(u l (:)) denote the posterior distribution over utility realizations.
Let S l (u l (:)) = f (U )(l) j U 2 supp G(u l (:))g denote the set of all ex ante potential stable match partners of agent l. That is, agents that could conceivably be part of a stable match, under the distribution over market match utilities updated by the private information u l (:):
Analogously, given the strategies played by all agents, S l (u l (:); h t;l ) denotes the set of all interim potential stable match partners given agent's l available information at t.
Frictionless Economies
Suppose there is no discounting, i.e., = 1: Then, one way in which information may be transmitted in the market is if agents simply follow DA strategies. That is, …rms make o¤ers to workers according to their match utilities, and exit the market only when all workers have rejected them. Workers hold on to their best available o¤er, and accept an o¤er only once the o¤er is from the …rm that yields the highest match utility given the set of …rms that are still unmatched. These prescriptions are followed by all agents after any detectable deviations as well. 16 An o¤er of …rm i to worker j that is held from period t to t' is recorded as an o¤er made in periods t; t + 1; :::; t'that is held by the worker in each of these periods. We use a similar convention for workers.
Proposition 3 (No Discounting) Suppose = 1, then DA strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies and yield the stable match.
Intuitively, when all agents use DA strategies, workers ultimately hold o¤ers from their stable match partners. The top-top match property implies that in every period either a match is formed, or only agents on one side remain unmatched. In particular, the process stops in …nite time. When = 1; the timing of matches is of no importance to market participants and unilateral deviations cannot generate a better match.
Economies with Frictions
When < 1, DA strategies are in general no longer incentive compatible. As an example, consider a complete information economy with two workers and two …rms, for which u
for all i; j: Match utilities are given as follows:
Firm 2 knows that worker 2 is the unique stable match partner and, furthermore, that worker 2 would accept an o¤er from …rm 2 immediately, as …rm 2 is worker 2 0 s …rst choice.
Hence, it cannot be an equilibrium for …rm 2 to …rst make an o¤er to worker 1 and lose a period. Firms may therefore be tempted not to make all o¤ers in order of their preferences, but rather concentrate on o¤ers to potential stable match partners. Similarly, workers may accept an o¤er from their highest potential stable match partner, even if more preferred …rms are still unmatched.
Before we attack the general problem of su¢ cient incentive compatible information transmission in decentralized markets, we start by analyzing some minimal conditions strategies have to satisfy in a centralized mechanism in order to generate the stable match. This allows us to temporarily avoid incentive compatibility hurdles that are due to interim learning.
That is, our …rst step is a generalization of the Lemma in Section 3, which illustrated the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium yielding the stable match (namely, one involving agents submitting their preference pro…le truthfully). The second step of our analysis entails a characterization of economies in which emulating the class of identi…ed strategies (from step 1) in a decentralized market is incentive compatible for all participants.
Certainly, if there is any hope of achieving the stable match (in a centralized setting) for any market realization, agents must declare potential stable matches acceptable. Furthermore, consider, e.g., the …rms. Since the centralized mechanism achieves the …rm optimal stable match for the submitted preferences, changing the ranking of agents that are preferred to the stable match would not change the resulting match in the centralized market. However, it is crucial that any agents ranked above any potential stable match are, in fact, preferred to that stable match. These restrictions suggest the following class of strategies, termed reduced DA strategies.
Formally, for each agent l 2 F [ W who submits utilities v corresponding to preferences
That is, P (v; ?) is the union of no partner (i.e., unmatched) and the set of match partners l strictly prefers to being unmatched given P (v):
De…nition (Reduced DA Strategies) Let E be an economy and assume agents participate in a centralized match: each agent l 2 F [ W submits utilities v corresponding to preferences P (v): Agents use reduced DA strategies if for each l 2 F [ W with 2 ff; wg :
The intuitive interpretation of the three conditions required by reduced DA strategies is the following. First, any potential stable match (using the agent's private information on match utilities) is declared acceptable. Second, potential stable matches are ranked truthfully.
Third, rankings of agents who are not potential stable matches above potential stable matches must be truthful with respect to the stable matches.
We now show that reduced DA strategies in a sense place minimal requirements for securing stability in centralized markets. Note that the conditions of reduced DA strategies depend only on the support of stable matches, and not their precise likelihood of occurrence. We consider economies with a …nite number of potential markets, and so strategy pro…les that generate the stable match need to be robust to how these markets are distributed. We say an agent l uses a rule if, for any economy E containing agent l; the agent uses a strategy that depends only on the set of market participants, the agent's realized match utilities, and the set of potential stable match partners. Agent l uses a reduced DA rule if the used strategy is a reduced DA strategy.
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Proposition 4 (Centralized Aligned Economies with Discounting)
1. If all agents use a reduced DA rule then for any economy E the outcome produced by the DA mechanism is the stable match.
2.
Suppose there is an agent a 2 F [ W who uses a rule that is not a reduced DA rule.
Then there exists an economy E for which the DA mechanism produces an outcome that is not stable in some market realization.
3. Given an economy E; all agents using reduced DA strategies constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game associated with the DA mechanism.
Proposition 4 illustrates the e¤ectiveness of reduced DA rules in generating the stable match outcome. Part 2 of the Proposition highlights the necessity of the conditions imposed by reduced DA strategies for implementing stable outcomes in any economy.
When moving from a centralized mechanism to a decentralized market, we need to translate reduced DA strategies to strategies in decentralized markets. For …rms the translation is straightforward. Whenever …rm i would submit a reduced DA strategy v; …rm i does the following in the decentralized market. In each period in which …rm i is not matched and does not have an o¤er held by a worker, …rm i makes an o¤er to its most preferred unmatched worker who has not rejected …rm i yet according to v (where ties are broken according to the same rules determining P (v) in the centralized setting). When …rm i gets rejected by the last 17 Reduced DA rules impose restrictions on the details of the economy agents can utilize in their strategies. In particular, suppose E 1 and E 2 are two economies with the same set of …rms and workers, both containing a market M = (U; F; W) such that for some agent l 2 F [ W of type 2 ff; wg the set of a-priori stable matches S l (u l (:)) is identical when M is realized in either economy. Then, if agent l uses a reduced DA rule, they must use the same reduced DA strategy in both E 1 and E 2 ; whenever observing u l (:): acceptable worker, the last worker who is still unmatched and has a higher utility than …rm i itself according to v; …rm i exits the market.
For workers, there are two aspects of strategies that are important. The …rst is when to start accepting o¤ers, and the second is which o¤er to accept. In terms of the latter, the use of weakly undominated strategies implies that when a worker accepts an o¤er, he has to accept the best available o¤er. Thus, each worker has to rank all …rms in the "right" order.
However, in a decentralized market a worker may accept an o¤er even if it is not the o¤er from his most preferred unmatched …rm. The translation of a reduced DA strategy v to a decentralized market will be captured by "threshold …rms". At each point in time, a worker accepts the best available o¤er whenever he receives an o¤er that he likes at least as much as his most preferred unmatched …rm ranked according to v; the "threshold …rm". So, if the reduced DA strategy v only ranks potential stable match partners, the worker accepts an o¤er as soon as he receives an o¤er he prefers at least as much as the most preferred unmatched potential stable match partner. Beyond that, we require workers to hold their best available o¤er as long as the o¤er is at least as good as their lowest potential stable match, and reject all other o¤ers.
A second element to account for when moving from a centralized to a decentralized market is that agents may use strategies in which actions depend on the history of play. Speci…cally, note that reduced DA strategies depend on the set of potential stable match partners. In decentralized markets, given the strategy pro…le of all other agents, each …rm or worker can recalculate and possibly re…ne their set of potential stable match partners over time.
Decentralized reduced DA strategies are therefore strategies that can be derived as above when allowing agents to submit a new reduced DA strategy every period. This allows them to take information they have accumulated into account. For a …rm this implies that the …rm makes an o¤er to workers that are at least as good as her most preferred unmatched potential stable match who has not rejected her yet. For a worker this implies that the best o¤er that is weakly preferred to his least preferred potential stable match is not rejected.
Furthermore, upon receiving an o¤er at least as good as his most preferred unmatched …rm according to v, the worker immediately accepts that o¤er. The worker rejects all o¤ers that are not as good as the least preferred potential stable match, and only holds one o¤er. Note that for any agent l 2 F [ W of type 2 ff; wg ; given the actions of all other agents, the actions of agent l using a decentralized reduced DA strategy up to any period t can be described by a single reduced DA strategy using S l u l (:); h t;l as the set of potential stable match partners.
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In centralized markets, we have seen that reduced DA strategies impose minimal restrictions on strategies to achieve stability and are incentive compatible. However, the decentralized counterpart of many such strategies is generally not incentive compatible in markets with frictions, as agents care about when matches are created. This may create incentives to make less o¤ers than those required by decentralized reduced DA strategies. Furthermore, the fact that agents update the set of potential stable match partners using the history of play opens room for a di¤erent class of manipulations intended to a¤ect the learning that occurs in the market (and, consequently, agents'perception of their conceivable stable match partners). Proposition 4 above suggested that decentralized reduced DA strategies are natural candidates for strategy pro…les that yield stable outcomes. Our goal now is to characterize the class of economies for which a subset of these strategies are incentive compatible.
When all agents in the market follow decentralized reduced DA strategies, …rms may at times be able to speed up the process by altering the ranking of agents. Intuitively, suppose that all other players use strategies that implement the stable outcome. There are economies in which a …rm's o¤er to a worker j who is not its …rst choice worker will be accepted only if that worker is actually its stable match partner. Then the …rm may have an incentive to make that o¤er …rst, in order to speed up the timing of its match, as such an "out of order" o¤er entails no risk of "wrong acceptance"if all other agents use strategies that implement the stable outcome. Below is a simple example of such a case in which no equilibrium implements the stable outcome with certainty.
19
Example 2 (Timing of Matches). Consider an economy with two …rms fF 1; F 2g and two workers fW 1; W 2g with u f ij = u w ij for each of 6 potential markets, described by the 18 As time progresses, learning can only lead to the elimination of previously perceived potential stable matches. Thus, the conditions imposed by reduced DA strategies are weakened in the interim stages.
19 Note that workers cannot speed things up by holding on to o¤ers that are not from potential stable match partners. However, holding such o¤ers is not necessarily strictly harmful to the worker, since the no cycle property assures that the rejection of an o¤er cannot trigger a chain yielding a more preferred o¤er.
following match utilities (notation as before):
; U 2 = 3 6 4 5 ; U 3 = 3 2 4 8 ; U 4 = 3 2 1 7 ; U 5 = 9 6 8 5 ; U 6 = 7 3 8 5 :
We will show that there are no equilibria in weakly undominated strategies that always implement the stable outcome.
U 3 and U 4 guarantee that F 1 sometimes makes an o¤er to W 1 in any equilibrium when W 1 0 s match utilities are (3; 4): 20 Similarly, U 5 and U 6 guarantee that W 2 with match utilities (6; 5) will in equilibrium sometimes receive no o¤er in period 1; but only in period 2.
21 From now on, we focus on U 1 and U 2 :
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Note that W 1 and W 2 always accept an o¤er from F 2 immediately in U 1 : Hence for any < 1; F 2 must make an o¤er to W 2 when U 1 is realized.
Assume given F 1's match utilities (3; 6); the probability of U 1 is p and that of U 2 is 1 p:
Suppose F 1 makes an o¤er to W 2 (in U 1 and U 2 ) in period 1. Then when U 2 prevails, F 2; that is aware U 2 is realized, makes an o¤er to W 1 in period 1; who will accept that o¤er. These strategies generate a payo¤ for F 1 of 6(1 p) + 3p :
Consider F 1's deviation to making an o¤er to W 1 in period 1: Note that along the equilibrium path F 1 makes an o¤er to W 1 with match utilities of (3; 4) only in U 3 ; when F 1 is the stable match, hence W 1 accepts an o¤er from F 1 whenever W 1 0 s match utilities are (3; 4) (and that is the only o¤er he observes): Hence W 1 accepts F 1 0 s o¤er also in U 1 . In U 2 the o¤er is rejected, and F 1 matches to W 2 in period 2 (as W 2 does not leave the market in period 1 when observing match utilities (6; 5); see above), resulting in payo¤s 6(1 p) + 3p: This deviation is pro…table when p > 2=3 (independent of ): The idea is that F 1 can assure that 20 Indeed, in U 4 , W 1 accepts an o¤er from F 1 immediately. Therefore, F 1 has an incentive to make an o¤er to W 1 in period 1 whenever U 4 is realized. However, F 1 cannot distinguish between U 3 and U 4 ; so what are possible consequences of an o¤er to W 1 in U 3 ? Given an o¤er from F 1; W 1 cannot exit (but he can reject the o¤er from F 1): Note that in U 3 it must be the case that F 2 makes an o¤er to W 2 that gets immediately accepted. Therefore, in period 2; if W 1 rejected the o¤er of F 1; F 1 can remake that o¤er, in which case W 1 has to acept it whenever using a weakly undominated strategy. Hence, in equilibrium, F 1 best responds by making an o¤er to W 1 whenever her match utilities are (3; 2):
21 In U 5 , F 1 makes an o¤er to W 1 who accepts immediately. In U 6 ; to guarantee a stable outcome, in period 1; F 2 with utilities (8; 5) cannot make an o¤er to W 2 and hence has to make an o¤er to W 1: This implies that in U 5 , W 2 does not receive any o¤ers in period 1 in equilibrium: However, W 2 receives an o¤er from F 2 in period 2: Therefore, W 2 cannot exit the market when he receives no o¤er in period 1:
22 In particular, F 1 observes (3; 6), W 1 observes (3; 4); and they cannot distinguish between U 1 and U 2 .
when approaching W 1 in period 1; its o¤er gets accepted only when W 1 is the stable match.
The e¤ect of such a deviation is therefore to speed up the creation of its match when U 1 is realized. The cost is the delay of a match with W 2 in U 2 . However, when U 1 is su¢ ciently more likely ex-ante (given F 1's private information), the bene…ts outweigh the costs.
Suppose F 1 makes an o¤er to W 1 with probability q 2 (0; 1] (in U 1 and U 2 ) in period 1: First, note that this implies that W 1 has to accept the o¤er from F 1 with positive probability, m 2 (0; 1]: 23 In order for the market to always yield a stable outcome, it has to be the case that F 2 makes an o¤er to W 1 with probability 1 in period 1 when U 2 prevails, which implies that W 1 has to accept the o¤er from F 1 whenever he receives that o¤er. Now, F 1 has the same trade-o¤ as before, and hence, F 1 strictly prefers making an o¤er to W 1;
implying that q = 1: Can we induce F 2 to make an o¤er to W 1 with certainty? When U 2 prevails, an o¤er to W 1 yields 4: An o¤er to W 2 yields 5 , which is bigger than 4 for > 4=5:
Hence, for large enough ; F 1 making an o¤er to W 1 with positive probability cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Suppose F 1 simply delays making an o¤er and makes an o¤er to its most preferred available worker in period 2: This clearly cannot be part of an equilibrium since F 1 can pro…tably deviate by making an o¤er to W 2 in period 1; which will be accepted with probability 1 p.
Assumption 1 rules out economies as in the example above. It makes sure that when all market participants follow decentralized reduced DA strategies, a …rm has no incentive to make an o¤er to a worker who is ranked below her favorite unmatched potential stable match partner that has not rejected her yet. If the …rm makes such an o¤er, Assumption 1 guarantees the …rm runs the risk of one of two eventualities. Either the …rm will have her o¤er held or accepted, as it is better than the stable match of the worker in the realized market. 24 Alternatively, in case the worker uses a decentralized reduced DA strategy that speci…es …rms that are less preferred than all potential stable matches as unacceptable, the …rm will be rejected immediately. Then, making an o¤er to that worker triggers no chain of o¤ers, rejections, or acceptances, and as such has no bene…t over not making an o¤er at all. 23 Suppose W 1 accepts F 1 with probability 0 in period 1: Then F 1's payo¤ from making an o¤er to W 1 in period 1 is 3p + 6(1 p) ; an o¤er to W 2 yields however 3p + 6(1 p);and F 1 would have a pro…table deviation. 24 Therefore, in that realized market, the worker is a worse match for the …rm than her stable match, as otherwise the worker and …rm would constitute a blocking pair.
The inclusion above may certainly be strict. For instance, consider an economy comprised only of U 1 and U 2 of Example 2. In that case, if …rms use a decentralized reduced DA strategy, worker W 1 who receives an o¤er from F 1 only in period 1 can infer that he will not receive another o¤er and that F 1 is his stable match partner. In particular, he could accept that o¤er, even though it is not from his …rst choice …rm. In fact, such examples hinge on there being e¤ectively only two relevant …rms and workers. However, such examples can be embedded in larger markets.
De…nition (Top Sub-economy) Suppose all agents use decentralized reduced DA strategies. A top sub-economy for worker j 1 consists of two …rms i 1 and i 2 and an additional worker j 2 such that in period t, worker j 1 has su¢ cient information to infer that:
1. for any j 2 fj 1 ; j 2 g: i 1 ; i 2 2 S w j u w j ; h w t;j and no other potential stable match is ranked higher than i 1 or i 2 :
2. Both i 1 and i 2 either have an outstanding o¤er to j 2 fj 1 ; j 2 g or make an o¤er to them in period t.
The generalization of the example above imposes a restriction on updating when a top sub-economy is reached. Indeed, suppose all agents use decentralized reduced DA strategies and that in period t worker j has a top sub-economy with …rms fi 1 ; i 2 g. If i is the most preferred …rm among those with an o¤er to j in period t then S As it turns out, in general cases in which S l (u l (:); h t;l ) ( BS l (u l (:); h t;l ) for an agent l of type 2 ff; wg; decentralized reduced DA strategies may be sensitive to manipulations.
Speci…cally, timing of o¤ers can be used to a¤ect the set of perceived potential stable partners.
The following example illustrates the power of such manipulations in an economy in which there does not exist a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies that always yields the stable outcome.
Example 3 (Manipulability of O¤er Timing). Consider an economy with three …rms fF 1; F 2; F 3g and three workers fW 1; W 2; W 3g in which u Suppose there exists an equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies that always implements the stable match.
U 3 guarantees that in such an equilibrium F 3 with match utilities (6; 8; 2) always makes an o¤er to W 2 in period 1:
26 Furthermore, U 4 guarantees that in any such equilibrium F 1 with match utilities (5; 4; 3) makes an o¤er to W 1 with probability 1. 27 From now on we 25 Note that the economy satis…es Assumption 1. 26 Such an o¤er will be immediately accepted in U 3 : Furthermore, if W 2 makes an o¤er to W 1 with some probability p > 0 in period 1; then in U 3 , W 1 is aware that the stable match partner is F 1 yelding match utility of 5; so W 1 will accept that o¤er, yielding an unstable outcome. 27 In U 4 ; W 1 accepts an o¤er from F 1 immediately. Note that in U 3 ; F 2 matches with W 3 and F 3 with W 2 in period 1 (see above). Hence, in U 3 , W 1 will match to F 1 in period 2 at the latest, so F 1 does not lose anything from making an o¤er to W 1 in period 1: concentrate on U 1 and U 2 :
Suppose F1 makes an o¤er to W3 in U 2 in period 1 with certainty. In this case, W 1 receives an o¤er from F 1 only when F 1 is the stable match partner (as in U 2 , F 3 makes an o¤er to W 2 in period 1 and to W 1 only in period 2). So in equilibrium W 1 will accept an o¤er from F 1 in period 1 if it is the only o¤er he receives. This provides strict incentives for F 1 to make an o¤er to W 1 even in U 2 ; resulting in an outcome that is not stable.
Suppose F1 makes an o¤er to W1 in U 2 with probability q 2 (0; 1]: When F 1 makes an o¤er to W 3; F 1 receives a payo¤ of 4, as W 3 accepts immediately. In order for the market to always yield a stable outcome, it has to be the case that W 1 never accepts an o¤er from F 1 in period 1 when he receives only that o¤er. Therefore, the expected payo¤ of F 1 from making an o¤er to W 1 is 4 < 4; in contradiction to F 1 playing a best response.
In the example, W 1 cannot distinguish U 1 from U 2 . Hence, his set of potential stable match partners at t = 1 is fF 1; F 3g when either is realized: The crux of the problem is the fact that W 1 cannot be certain whether he will receive his best o¤er in period 1 or period 2: W 1 tries to infer that from o¤ers received in period 1: However, o¤ers can then be manipulated. The example illustrates the potential for manipulation of o¤ers when information regarding the set of potential stable match partners is transmitted by the mere timing of an o¤er (or the acceptance of an o¤er). This form of information transmission needs to be restricted to allow for equilibria that yield the stable match. In what follows we will identify economies that are consistent with these restrictions. Assumption 2 simply poses that when all market participants follow decentralized reduced DA strategies, the ordering of o¤ers and matches does not convey information in and of itself to either workers or …rms, with the caveat that there is no top sub-economy. Formally, Assumption 2 Suppose all agents follow decentralized reduced DA strategies. Let U be in the support of G and l be an agent of type 2 ff; wg: Assume that in period t if = w the worker l has no top sub-economy. For each j; k 2 BS l u l (:); h t;l ; if u l (j) > u l (k) and k 2 S l u l (:); h t;l ; then j 2 S l u l (:); h t;l .
Assumption 2 assures …rms cannot cross out their favorite available potential stable match from the set of perceived potential stable matches S . Similarly for workers. An exception occurs when a worker is in a top sub-economy. In that case, when a worker receives only one o¤er, he believes the o¤ering …rm is his stable match.
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Assumptions 1 and 2 prove crucial in assuring incentive compatibility of decentralized reduced DA strategies. We therefore introduce:
De…nition (Rich Economy) An economy is rich if it satis…es Assumptions 1 and 2.
Note that richness refers to the support of potential match utilities. It does not rule out probabilistic updating on the likelihood of di¤erent agents being one's stable match in the realized market. While richness is certainly restrictive (we shall return to some important examples later on), it is an assumption that is satis…ed in several leading examples:
Examples of Rich Economies 1. Complete Information Economies. Under complete information, agents know their stable match at the outset (it is a singleton).
2. Full Support Economies. For a …xed set of …rms F and workers W, let U( ) denote the set of all aligned match utilities in which each match utility is taken from a set of potential payo¤s . Consider the economy in which full support is put on elements of U( ): When contains enough elements, say, 2W F + W + F (so that some elements of U( ) are such that all match utilities in the market are di¤erent from one another), the economy is rich.
The examples highlight the idea that richness essentially implies that there is either a lot of correlation between agents'realized preferences (the extreme case corresponding to complete information), in which no learning at all takes place during the decentralized market game, or very little correlation (the extreme case being a full support economy), so that learning occurs only by eliminating agents who have exited the market or been involved in a rejection.
Before stating our existence result, we introduce a mixed decentralized reduced DA strategy which puts positive probability only on pure decentralized reduced DA strategies.
Recall that decentralized reduced DA strategies are weakly undominated. The equilibrium implementability of stable outcomes is captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Aligned Preferences -Existence) Suppose the economy is rich. For su¢ ciently high ; there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies of the decentralized market game in which workers use decentralized reduced DA strategies and …rms use mixed decentralized reduced DA strategies. Furthermore, the outcome is the unique stable match.
The proof of Proposition 5 follows three steps. First, we set the decentralized reduced DA strategy of workers to be minimal, so that they only rank potential stable match partners.
When …rms use arbitrary mixed decentralized reduced DA strategies we show that: 1. Workers are best responding, and 2. Each …rm's best responses is within the set of decentralized reduced DA strategies (though not necessarily coinciding with those prescribed by the original pro…le considered). Second, we consider a restricted (…nite) market game in which agents'strategies are restricted so that workers use minimal decentralized reduced DA strategies and …rms use arbitrary decentralized reduced DA strategies. We …nd an equilibrium in that game. From the …rst step, it follows that this is an equilibrium in the full game. These two steps establish the existence of an equilibrium in which all agents use (possibly mixed) decentralized reduced DA strategies. The third step uses Proposition 4 to deduce that in any such equilibrium, the market outcome is stable. Note that these strategies survive iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Proposition 5 implies that, as long as learning in the market is restricted in terms of what can be deduced from the mere timing of events, stability can arise as an equilibrium outcome. 
Conclusions and Extensions
We analyzed when a decentralized market game in which …rms make o¤ers and workers react to them allows for an equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies that yields the stable match. This is the case when the economy consists of a single market, and hence all agents know who 29 Uniqueness, however, is generally not guaranteed. their stable match partner is. It is also the case when there are no market frictions (taking the form of discounting in our model). When there are both uncertainty and discounting, the economy needs to be su¢ ciently rich and discounting has to be insubstantial enough for there to be an equilibrium that yields a stable outcome.
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The paper studied the link between a cooperative concept, the core (which is equivalent to the set of stable outcomes) and (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium in a market game. In our environments there is always a way to implement the stable outcome as a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium using a centralized clearinghouse to which agents (strategically) report (ordinal) preferences. Hence, the paper emphasizes the di¤erences between markets organized in a decentralized as opposed to a centralized way.
A …rst di¤erence is that in a decentralized market game, actions, i.e., o¤ers, (temporary) acceptances, and rejections can depend on past histories. The consequences of such contingent actions are easily seen in the case of complete information. Decentralized markets allow for Nash equilibria in which the outcome may be unstable, even though a centralized clearinghouse implements only stable outcomes through Nash equilibrium. Our alignment assumption assures that simple re…nements restore uniqueness in decentralized markets. However, when preferences are not aligned, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes withstands these re…nements (see Niederle and Yariv, 2009) . Indeed, for general preferences, markets with a unique stable match may contain sub-markets admitting more than one stable match. This may introduce incentives for …rms to deviate from the equilibrium that yields the stable outcome of the whole market.
A second di¤erence between a centralized clearinghouse and a decentralized market game concerns whether su¢ cient information is transmitted to allow agents to infer the stable outcome. In a decentralized market game enough information has to be transmitted in an incentive compatible way so that: …rst, workers end up with o¤ers from the right …rms and, second, workers know when to accept o¤ers. Here too alignment is important. Indeed, consider even the frictionless decentralized market game that always admits an equilibrium yielding the stable outcome. The construction of such an equilibrium hinges on the fact that, due to alignment, in every period there is a top-top match. That is, there is a …rm and worker pair that exits the market. This makes the market conclude in …nite time. When preferences are not aligned, it is less obvious whether workers perceive when the market is over, potentially providing …rms with incentives to manipulate these perceptions by withholding o¤ers for a few periods. 31 Finally, a centralized clearinghouse can implement in equilibrium the stable outcomes in the presence of both uncertainty and frictions (the latter playing no role in the centralized setting). In decentralized markets, stable outcomes can be generated through Bayesian Nash equilibria only when the economy is rich. As it turns out, the su¢ ciency of our richness assumption relies on preference alignment. Indeed, the stable blocking pair property of aligned preferences assures that …rms making o¤ers only to potential stable match partners is su¢ -cient to eventually generate the stable outcome. This is not necessarily the case for general preferences (again, see Niederle and Yariv, 2009 ).
Our analysis also highlights the importance of frictions, captured by discounting or the probability of a market breakdown. We note that frictions can take a variety of forms that would lead to similar conceptual insights. For instance, frictions could take the form of costly o¤ers. Suppose generating an o¤er costs an amount of c: All of our existence results would carry through where, in analogy to a vanishing discounting factor, c would become su¢ ciently small.
We posed a particular normal form game as a model for decentralized markets. Namely, we assumed that in every period …rms …rst simultaneously decide whether and to whom to make an o¤er. Workers collect all their o¤ers and decide whether to accept, reject, hold o¤ers or exit the market. We stress that these market rules are not only natural on realistic grounds, but also (possibly consequently) shared by the vast majority of papers on decentralized markets. Furthermore, our conceptual results are robust to several modi…cations. Indeed, the model can be directly extended to allow for markets in which only a fraction of …rms are able to make o¤ers in every period. The results can also be directly translated to a symmetric world in which workers make o¤ers and …rms collect them. Nonetheless, we view the market game analyzed in this paper as a starting point.
Ultimately, the paper shows that when studying markets, it is generally crucial to under-31 Without alignment, this discussion suggests the need for fuller monitoring of actions in the market to generate stable outcomes in equilibrium, even without discounting (see Niederle and Yariv, 2009). stand market characteristics that go beyond the identi…cation of market participants and their preferences. Indeed, it is important to describe markets in detail, in terms of the information available to participants and the plausibility of frictions, in order to be able to predict which outcomes they may achieve. This, in turn, implies that channels by which information can be transmitted among market participants can be a critical element of market design.
set of …rms and workers and hence inferior to M (i) = j and M (j) = i; respectively. That is, the stable blocking property holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider any Nash equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Workers using weakly undominated strategies assures that, at any stage, a worker who receives an o¤er from their most preferred available …rm accepts that o¤er immediately.
At period 1; any …rm i 2 F Since preferences are aligned, in every period with unmatched agents, there is either a toptop match that is formed, or only agents on one side of the market are unmatched. Thus, DA strategies generate a market match in …nite time. From the convergence of the Gale-Shapley algorithm to a stable match it follows that DA strategies yield the stable match.
We now show that DA strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Workers can deviate in two ways. First, a worker j can reject an o¤er from …rm i instead of holding it. From the no cycle property, such a rejection cannot launch a chain generating a superior o¤er for j. Therefore, if i a potential stable match partner, then such a rejection may lead j to forgo his best o¤er in some market. Such a deviation could therefore be pro…table only if it makes the worker su¢ ciently better o¤ in some market realization in which …rm i is not his stable match. However, in any market, it cannot be that i is strictly better than j's stable match partner, as then j should never receive an o¤er from i (indeed, by the construction of DA strategies; …rm i and worker j would form a blocking pair to the stable match). The second potential deviation of a worker is the acceptance of an o¤er that is not from his most preferred unmatched …rm. However, with time workers are made better o¤, as they receive new o¤ers. Therefore, accepting an o¤er early cannot be a pro…table deviation when = 1:
Consider now the …rms. Suppose …rm i deviates and makes an o¤er to worker j who is not the most preferred worker among workers who have not rejected i yet. Since = 1, if there is a market in which i strictly bene…ts from this deviation, it must be the case that i ends up matching with a strictly preferable worker. Suppose the resulting match in the market (assuming all other agents follow the DA strategies) is . The match has the property that the set of …rms F 0 ; who prefer this match to the stable match M ; is not empty, as it contains at least …rm i: By the Blocking Lemma there exists a blocking pair (i ; j ) with i not in F 0 such that j is matched in to a …rm in F 0 (see, e.g., Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) . However, since i and j follow DA strategies, i must have made an o¤er to j ; in contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4.
1. Assume all agents use a reduced DA rule and suppose E is an economy with a market realization in which the outcome 0 is di¤erent than the stable match M . By Proposition 1, there exists a pair (i ; j ) that blocks with M (i ) = j . This implies that u 2. Suppose a 2 F [ W is an agent who does not use a DA rule. That is, agent a ranks some agent (including potentially a themselves) as preferred to a potential stable match when match utilities prescribe otherwise. Whenever there is only one worker or only one …rm, the claim follows trivially. Assume then that jFj ; jWj 2:
Certainly, if a ranks a potential stable match as unacceptable, then whenever the market in which the unique stable match entails that individual match for a, the centralized outcome is not stable.
Suppose that a 2 W ranks a potential stable match i below a …rm i 0 who is not a potential stable match when observing u w a and the set of potential stable matches is S. Assume u w ia > u w i 0 a : Let j 2 W be another worker (other than a).
Consider an economy in which there are three markets characterized by match utilities U;Ũ ; andÛ in which in the corresponding stable matches all agents A other than i; i 0 ; a; and j are prescribed to be matched to agents in A or remain unmatched. It therefore su¢ ces to focus on match utilities corresponding to agents fi; i 0 ; a; jg:
We construct U andŨ so that they satisfy the following: 32 a. Firm i 0 cannot distinguish between the two markets, while all other agents can:
b. Firm i 0 prefers worker a to worker j in both markets.
c. Under U; i and a; and i 0 and j; are part of the stable match, while underŨ ; i 0 and a are part of the stable match.
d. UnderŨ ; i 0 is both a's and j's most preferred …rm.
U is such thatû w j =ũ w j ; so that worker j cannot distinguishŨ fromÛ ; and j is the most preferred worker for i 0 .
Each of the remaining markets in the economy is one in which a's match utilities are given by u w a and the stable match is an element i 00 2 S n fig.
If the stable match is achieved underÛ ; worker j must rank …rm i 0 as acceptable when observingû w j =ũ w j : Therefore, if the stable match is achieved underŨ ; it must be the case that i 0 ranks a higher than j (and acceptable) when observing u f i 0 : But then, under U , it cannot be the case that the stable match is established. Indeed, the centralized mechanism generates a stable match for the submitted preference rankings, and i 0 and a would form a blocking pair.
A similar construction can be presented if a 2 W ranks a potential stable match i below a less preferred potential stable match i 0 when observing u w a and the set of potential stable matches is S. Furthermore, analogous constructions follow when agent a is a …rm that does not follow a reduced DA rule. 32 These conditions are consistent with alignment: Indeed, assuming without restriction that u w kl ;ũ f kl > 2 for any k 2 f?; a; jg and l 2 f?; i; i 0 g the reader can think of the following manifestation of U;Ũ in which we summarize preferences through the following two matrixes, where the …rst number in each rubric corresponds to the …rm's preference and the second number to the appropriate worker: 3. Assume all agents follow a pro…le v of reduced DA strategies. For …rms, since truthful revelation is a weakly dominant strategy in the …rm-proposing DA algorithm, which the centralized market emulates, no deviation can be strictly pro…table.
Suppose a worker j has a strictly pro…table deviation to a strategy j . If j is also a reduced DA strategy, then by part 1 above the outcome is unchanged, in contradiction. Suppose then that j yields a match such that u w (j)j > u w M (j)j : Then, by Proposition 1, there exists a pair (i ; j ) that blocks such that M (i ) = j : First, it is clear that j 6 = j since j strictly prefers to M : Since both i and j submit reduced DA strategies, i must rank j above (i ): Hence, it must be that j rejects i through the centralized mechanism, contradicting the fact that (i ; j ) are a blocking pair to :
Proof of Proposition 5. We …rst note that for su¢ ciently high ; whenever all other workers use minimal reduced DA strategies, specifying only potential stable match partners as acceptable, and …rms use mixed decentralized reduced DA strategies, using a minimal reduced DA strategy is a best response for a worker.
Indeed, at each period t; for su¢ ciently high ; a worker cannot bene…t by exiting the market whenever a potential stable match is still available, nor from accepting an o¤er from a …rm who is not his most preferred potential stable match. Last, a worker having o¤ers at hand cannot bene…t by rejecting a set of …rms di¤erent than the set of all …rms but his most preferred (in case it is more preferred than his lowest potential stable match). From the no cycle property, rejection of …rms cannot generate the arrival of an o¤er from a preferred …rm, and reduced DA strategies assure that rejected …rms will not make future (repeat) o¤ers. In particular, such deviations cannot speed up matches, nor alter positively the ultimate match.
We now show that richness assures that whenever workers use a minimal decentralized reduced DA strategy and …rms use mixed decentralized reduced DA strategies, a …rm's best responses are within the class of reduced DA strategies.
Consider …rst a …rm i that in period t has no outstanding o¤ers, and whose updated strategies suggest worker j as the most preferred stable match. There are two kinds of deviations from a decentralized reduced DA prescription: (1) make no o¤er, or (2) make an o¤er to some other worker k who is ranked below j: The bene…ts of such deviations can be either through speeding up the time at which the …rm's o¤er is accepted, or through generating a preferred ultimate match.
Regarding (1), if …rm i does not make an o¤er at period t; there are three potential implications. First, if making an o¤er according to any decentralized reduced DA strategy would not have a¤ected market participants'history following period t;
33 then the only e¤ect of this deviation could be the prolonging of its match creation. If not making an o¤er a¤ects certain participants' histories, then due to Assumption 2; this cannot a¤ect the …rm's …nal match. Again, such a deviation can only prolong the timing of the match. Finally, suppose that the …rm's most preferred potential stable match has a top sub-economy at period t that contains …rm i: If the worker receives an o¤er from the other …rm in his top sub-economy, he will accept that o¤er immediately, even if he prefers …rm i; in which case …rm i is strictly worse o¤.
Regarding (2), suppose …rm i makes an o¤er to a worker k who is lower ranked than her most preferred potential stable match j. By Assumption 1; either the …rm will be immediately rejected, in which case she does not bene…t, or with positive probability her o¤er will be held or accepted by k in a market in which she would have otherwise gotten a preferable worker:
Such a deviation can never lead to a better ultimate match from the incentive compatibility inherent in the …rm-proposing DA algorithm. Indeed, note that such a deviation would be tantamount to submitting an untruthful preference list when the …rm proposing DA algorithm is used (as, from Assumption 2, such an o¤er will not make other participants change their e¤ective rank orderings). However, revealing preferences truthfully is a dominant strategy for …rms.
Consider now the restricted centralized market game in which workers' strategy set is con…ned to minimal decentralized reduced DA strategies, and …rms'strategy set is con…ned to decentralized reduced DA strategies (mixed or pure). Since there is a …nite number of …rms' decentralized reduced DA strategies, an equilibrium (possibly mixed) exists in this restricted game. From the above, for su¢ ciently high ; the corresponding strategy pro…le is also an equilibrium in our original decentralized market game, as required. 33 For instance, in the case in which any such strategy suggests an o¤er to j; who gets matched in that period with probability 1:
